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Essays on Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal
World
Niagalé Bagayoko and Lyndsay McLean Hilker
Summary
These two papers add further dimensions to the discussions in IDS Bulletin 40.2
(March 2009) on ‘Transforming Security and Development in an Unequal World’
edited by Robin Luckham, Niagalé Bagayoko, Lucia Dammert, Claudio Fuentes
and Michael Solis. Like the contributions to the latter, they were first discussed at
the founding Colloquium of the Global Consortium for Security Transformation
held at Kandalama, Sri Lanka in September 2007. 
Niagalé Bagayoko’s paper on ‘State, Non-State and Multilateral Logics of Action in
Post-Conflict Environments’ considers the complexities of Northern policymaking
and their impacts in post-conflict countries. It thus differs from but complements
IDS Bulletin 40.2, which focuses mostly on security and development from a
Southern perspective. 
She argues that a number of different policy logics are at work in the security,
development, humanitarian and media etc domains, which are sometimes 
coordinated – but often in tension with – each other. Her approach thus differs
from that of certain critical voices in the NGO and academic worlds, which hold
that there is a danger that Northern security priorities might ‘securitise’ the 
humanitarian and development agendas, particularly in post-conflict environments.
While these dangers are real, nevertheless one should not stereotype all 
international actors as ‘Northern’ or as promoting Northern security (e.g. anti-ter-
rorist) agendas. It is instead more fruitful to view such actors as diverse players
with conflicting interests that operate according to different policy logics.
Lyndsay McLean Hilker’s paper on ‘Why Identity Politics Matters for Security and
What Follows for Research and Policy’ spells out a general framework for analysis
of identity-based violent conflict, drawing upon empirical examples, including
Rwanda, where she has focused her own research. It is unique in its focus on the
implications of analysis and research on identity politics for development policy. 
She contends that identity politics matter both to the persistence of insecurity and
to the achievement of greater security. Evidence from multiple contexts 
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demonstrates that identity provides an effective basis for group mobilisation into
collective action – both violent and non-violent in nature. If we are to work to 
combat insecurity at the local as well as the global level, we need to look in more
depth at the processes leading to violence in the name of identity in specific 
contexts, and explore the types of interventions that can prevent and respond to
such violence. It is especially important to understand under what circumstances
identity politics can be exercised in ways that are inclusive and empowering rather
than exclusionary or violent.
Keywords: security; conflict; ethnicity; identities; post-conflict reconstruction;
humanitarianism; peace-building.
Niagalé Bagayoko Penone is a Fellow of the IDS. She is a political scientist with
a doctorate from the University of Paris. Her publications include a book in French
on US and French security policies in sub-Saharan Africa. She is currently
researching sector reform in francophone African countries and has led field
research in Central African Republic, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal. She has also
studied interagency and multilateral processes in post-conflict environments as
well as on sub-regional security mechanisms in West Africa (ECOWAS) and on
African conflict-management mechanisms.
Lyndsay McLean Hilker is a final year doctoral student in Development
Studies/Social Anthropology at the University of Sussex, UK. Her thesis looks at
ethnicity and reconciliation among youth in contemporary Rwanda. She previously
worked for the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and for the
European Council as Political Assistant to the EU Special Envoy for the Great
Lakes Region. She has also worked as an independent consultant on Rwanda
and other African countries on conflict and post-conflict issues.
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State, Non-State and Multilateral
Logics of Action in Post-Conflict
Environments
Niagalé Bagayoko
Critical voices in the NGO and academic worlds argue that there is a danger that
Western security priorities might ‘securitise’ the humanitarian and development
agendas, particularly in post-conflict environments. While these dangers are real,
nevertheless one should not stereotype all international actors as ‘Northern’ or as
promoting ‘Western’ security (e.g. anti-terrorist) agendas. Rather than 
caricaturising all the international actors that intervene in post-conflict situations
with such global labels, it is more fruitful to view them as diverse players with 
conflicting interests that operate according to different policy logics. 
Indeed, post-conflict environments involve an ever-increasing range of inter-
national actors. The first category of actors includes agents deployed by Northern
states, while the second category constitutes the agents deployed by multilateral
organisations. A third set of international stakeholders include non-state actors,
such as NGOs, private companies and media organisations. These various actors
are driven by very differing normative agendas. While they engage in the same
fields of study and reform, their logics of action refer to standards, norms or 
procedures that are often hardly compatible one with each other. 
It is thus possible to identify five logics of action that can explain the failures or
limited successes of interventions in post-conflict environments: 
l the security field is both embedded in a military and a constabulary logic of 
action;
l in the humanitarian field, the charity logic of action often clashes with a 
political approach to humanitarian assistance; 
l in the field of peace building, institutional engineering is often torn between 
different national approaches to public service; 
l in the reconstruction field, a profit logic may be in opposition with a solidarity 
logic; 
l the media field finds it difficult to harmonise communication with audience 
rating logics. 
In addition some post-conflict policies, particularly those of great powers, are 
primarily driven by the transformation of their internal security structures rather
than by needs on the ground.
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1 The security field, between military and constabulary logics
Two kinds of security missions characterise post-conflict environments. The first
type involves preventing the resumption of hostilities and ensuring the protection
of minorities. These missions clearly fall under the responsibility of the military,
which often adopts a deterrent posture continuing into the conflict management
phase. The second kind of mission consists of maintaining and enforcing law and
order. These missions consist of quelling riots, preventing violence through 
community policing, managing ethnic tensions, fighting against organised crime,
and dismantling criminal networks. 
Interventions in the field of law and order fall under the responsibility of both 
military and police forces.1 For instance, the French armed forces have developed
the so-called ‘crowd control’ doctrine (doctrine de controle des foules), which is
intended for riot management, while American land forces have increasingly
become involved in penal and judicial missions, as well as the training of internal
security forces, notably in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Concurrently, police forces
have become new actors of post-conflict operations. The UN has developed the
International Civilian Police Program (CIVPOL) and the European Union (EU) has
promoted a constabulary approach within the framework of the ‘civilian 
management of crises’ concept, developed under the European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP). The police forces of Southern Europe (France, Italy,
Spain, and Portugal) have joined together under the European Gendarmerie
Force. 
Military and police forces each refer to different standards (principles of war such
as concentration of forces; strategies of offensive action and surprise versus
negotiation and minimal use of force, etc.). Corporate rivalries between military
and police forces can also prevent both forces from collaborating on the ground. 
Beyond the military and police, private companies are now fulfilling a growing
number of functions that were previously fulfilled by the traditional armed and
police forces (Makki 2004). These private security companies are bringing in new
operating procedures and standards that interfere with both military and police
force norms. 
2 The humanitarian field, between charity and politics
The humanitarian field is the one with the most diverse set of intervening actors.
This sphere of action is surrounded first of all by international organisations, be
they multilateral (United National High Commissioner for Refugees, United
Nations Children’s Fund, etc.) or not (International Committee of the Red Cross).
These organisations, which were specially created with the aim of assisting 
marginalised populations, are operating according to a charitable model and have
a mandate to act during emergencies as well as over the longer term. 
1 Charles Moskos’ distinction between military and constabulary ethos in peacekeeping can also be 
applied to post-conflict environments (Moskos 1975).
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NGOs specialising in emergency assistance constitute the second category of
actors. These organisations differ from one another with regard to their codes of
ethics, their funding strategies, their operational capacities and the relationships
they develop with other actors. It is thus difficult to consider NGOs as comprising
a homogeneous and coherent group. Nevertheless, most French NGOs 
demonstrate their willingness to promote the principles of independence, neutrality
and impartiality. To them, humanitarian action is an end in itself and cannot be
considered as instrumental; humanitarian assistance must only be driven by an
exclusively charitable logic. 
This logic of charitable action, concurrently claimed by international organisations
and by some NGOs, places human rights at the heart of organisational 
commitment in post-conflict environments. These actors believe that individual
rights take precedence over the interests and the sovereignty of states and that
‘humanitarian assistance’ should be defined in terms of ‘human security’. Other
notably American NGOs (such as CARE, World Vision, Save the Children) 
promote the same human security principles but do not insist in such a 
demanding way on the independence of their sphere of action. Instead, they 
collaborate more easily with the other actors that intervene in the humanitarian
field. 
In addition to multilateral bodies and NGOs, the armed forces also engage in the
humanitarian field. The dangers of the ‘militarisation of the humanitarian action’
are frequently underlined, with servicemen often being accused of encroaching on
the NGOs’ field of action. It is, however, advisable to maintain a distinction among
the logics of humanitarian intervention of different Northern military and security
structures. Indeed, contrary to common belief, military intervention in the 
humanitarian field is far from only a recent phenomenon, stemming from the 
formalisation of the CIMIC (civilian–military cooperation) doctrines developed by
NATO and American armed forces. 
Indeed the Geneva Agreements and the international laws of armed conflict
impose a number of humanitarian obligations on the armed forces. Some armed
forces, such as the French or the US Marines, have fulfilled humanitarian 
missions since the nineteenth century. According to the rules set up by colonial
Generals Lyautey and Gallieni (Dabezies 2001), or by Calwell’s ‘small wars’
doctrine, implementing humanitarian programmes (supply of care, construction of
schools, roads and other infrastructure) has, for a long-time, been considered a
tactic requiring the insertion of soldiers into the local environment (Calwell 1986).
That is why many servicemen consider intervention in humanitarian affairs to be
legitimate despite the reservations of humanitarian NGOs. 
At the same time military intervention in the humanitarian field is increasingly
being connected to more political logics. During the past 15 or so years, the
humanitarian field has become increasingly occupied by political and strategic
concerns. Political actors are knowingly co-opting humanitarian action as a tool for
crisis management. Increasingly, politicians view humanitarian action as a political
instrument that can provide legitimacy to security policies. US military action in
Indonesia following the tsunami is a telling example, as the United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM) mobilised contingencies to bring humanitarian assistance
to devastated regions. According to US officials, this allowed the image of the US
IDS WORKING PAPER 322
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to be restored, showing Muslim countries that the US did not hesitate in helping a
country that is home to the largest Muslim population in the world. Humanitarian
assistance in that case aimed not only at helping populations affected by a natural
disaster, but also at widening American ‘soft power’. The Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRT) combining security, relief and development functions
in Afghanistan and the Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) in Iraq show
that humanitarian intervention is increasingly seen as a ‘force multiplier’ in some
American politico-military circles.2 The armed forces of other western armies are
also called on to directly assume humanitarian work within the framework of the
CIMIC doctrine or to provide visible support to NGOs. 
Thus, an instrumentalist approach is developing, which tends to consider 
humanitarian assistance as a politico-diplomatic lever. This obviously clashes with
the principles guiding the action of a number of NGOs inspired by the inheritance
of the French Medecins Sans Frontieres. To these NGOs, the instrumental
approach established political control over humanitarian assistance, prioritising
political objectives rather than the needs of the populations on the ground. Facing
growing interference by the military in the humanitarian field, several NGOs have
pleaded for a clarification of the roles of each actor. They also argue that being
linked to the security objectives of external intervention forces is likely to endanger
their own safety and, consequently, limit their access to civilian populations. NGOs
tend to consider that their insertion in the local environment and the relationships
of trust they are able to develop with local people are their best protection. Being
identified with the armed forces tends to destroy this protection as well as the
NGOs’ independent stance. NGOs risk being characterised under the Western
label and are often seen as occupying forces by local communities. 
Consequently, coordination of the actors intervening in the humanitarian field
seems difficult to achieve, as so far the charitable principles that drive the actions
of numerous NGOs seems widely paradoxical with the political logic underlying
the humanitarian action being deployed by northern states. 
3 The field of state-building (politico-institutional engineering): 
a public service logic
The objective of state-building is to reorganise Southern states’ apparatuses 
following conflicts by favouring the restoration of basic institutional structures. With
the former institutional system having disappeared or been modified profoundly
due to conflicting dynamics, new missions and modes of functioning of the state
are enacted during post-conflict periods often under the aegis of the international
community. First, state-building aims to restore the state’s ability to manage key
institutions such as the police, the judicial system, and the economy (budget, 
currency, taxes). Then, a new organisation of powers (organisation of the 
2 The PRT are made up of mixed teams, integrating both civilians and servicemen (often from the 
Special forces). Their mission is to facilitate development and reconstruction in Afghanistan. In Iraq, 
the DART, mostly made up of civilians and deployed under the aegis of the USAID, provides 
humanitarian assistance in order to support the military activities of the US armed forces.
legislative, executive and judiciary powers) is introduced while a more efficient
administrative structure is established. 
Setting up a temporary government is often the first step towards the institutional
reorganisation of a post-conflict country. In this field, multilateral organisations
(UN, EU, etc) are often the main actors. Northern states are also often called
upon to deploy their own experts in order for them to provide assistance in the
politico-institutional engineering process. Policemen and territorial administrators
can be sent by the home offices, and the Ministries of Justice can mobilise jurists
and magistrates. Such agents can be deployed as members of the UN 
administration, as members of regional missions of the UN or Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or as experts of their own national
government in a bilateral framework. They can then serve as advisors to the new
local civil servants. 
These state or multilateral actors intervene according to a public service logic.
However, one should keep in mind that state-building, in essence, refers to the
exporting of politico-institutional models. By contributing to state-building in failed
states, Northern countries seek to promote their own modes of organisation. As a
consequence, there is often a latent competition between the various members of
multinational coalitions, with each trying to reorganise the administration according
to its national model. 
The case of the reorganisation of the police in Kosovo is a good example of this
competition between national models. The USA wished to set up a decentralised
police system, while France suggested setting up a dual police system (with both
police and gendarmerie forces). In Afghanistan, the Bonn agreement ended by
giving each international actor the responsibility of reorganising one sector as a
whole; Italy was responsible for judicial reorganisation, Germany was in charge of
the police, Japan was responsible for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and
Reintegration (DDR) programmes, UK for the fight against drugs, the US for 
training the Afghan army, and the European Commission and the World Bank for
reform of the state. The institutions that emerge in the wake of such sharing
arrangements are often seen as being ‘tinkered’ with; in this sense, they are the
result of an artificial combination of heterogeneous elements that stem from 
various national traditions rather than being the result of a coherent framework
that is tailored to local specifications. 
4 The field of reconstruction: profit and solidarity
It is during the post-conflict phase that the first programmes of reconstruction,
aiming at rebuilding infrastructure, begin to form. Profit, connected to industrial
purposes (e.g. the purchasing of concessions), is one of the forms of logic that
drive the intervention of northern states in the field of reconstruction. National
strategies, aimed at winning post-conflict reconstruction markets, are set up in
support of national private companies. The conquest of post-conflict local markets
then depends on the efficiency of the diplomatic apparatus. Indeed, the promotion
of national economic interests, through support to private companies, requires
very specific methods. It does not solely consist of bilateral negotiations at the
political level. 
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Mostly, post-conflict countries are small states with unreliable markets that do not
offer large-scale or long-term profit opportunities. Competition in these markets is
not the same as in stronger markets. Further, the major characteristics of a post-
conflict environment are latent insecurity and competition between companies to
acquire multilateral financing for reconstruction programmes. At both these levels,
private companies seek support from their national governments. First, companies
need to acquire support (technical and logistical assistance, information, personal
security when necessary) that is frequently provided by the national armed forces.
Second, private companies need to be introduced to multinational donors, as the
ability to lobby multilateral donors is key in the defence of national economic 
interests. 
However, in the field of reconstruction, the logic of profit is not the only one that
prevails in the intervention of Northern states. Most interventions are also 
concurrently driven at least in principle by a logic of development. The logic of
development does not necessarily contradict the logic of profit, as programmes
dedicated to the rehabilitation of infrastructure can rely on both logics. For
instance, in France, the double role of the AFD (Agence francaise de 
developpement) – operating both as a banking institution (which provide grants
loans to companies) and as an operator for development on the ground – 
illustrates the possible complementarities between development and commercial
logics. 
Of course development is not solely confined to the material aspect of 
reconstruction. Development policies also aim to provide structural and long-term
support to social groups weakened and marginalised by conflict. This support
includes programmes with health, social or educational goals, aiming to create the
conditions for durable and equitable development. They are operated by the 
individual donors through their development agencies (USAID, DFID, AFD), by
multilateral bodies (UNDP) or by some NGOs specialised in the provision of 
long-term social programmes. Such development actors generally consider that
reconstruction has to draw on a logic of solidarity, while private companies – 
supported by some departments of their national governments – consider that
their contribution to reconstruction has to guarantee them a return on their 
investments. 
Consequently, in post-conflict environments, reconstruction is at the heart of a
twofold debate:
l Firstly, must assistance be directed toward supporting national private 
companies, or must it be directed toward providing direct assistance to local 
populations? This question is the subject of considerable controversy and 
debate in Northern countries. 
l Secondly, what should be the role of local actors in reconstruction processes?
Indeed, local actors tend increasingly to denounce development actors as 
well as international companies for imposing unfair competition on local 
companies. Such a situation prevents, in their view, the emergence of a local 
private sector. 
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5 The field of media, between audience ratings and 
communication 
Intervention in the field of media involves publicity for actions and programmes
implemented in post-conflict environments. All actors (states, multilateral 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, etc.) seek to involve the media
and adopt a communication logic, which aims to legitimise their actions and 
augment public support. On the other hand, it is worth noting that the media as
such is often strangely absent in post-conflict environments. It is mostly before
and above all during the conflicts that the media plays a crucial role by alerting
the public to the dramatic reality of some conflicts, which may, as a consequence,
provoke intervention from the North. By contrast, after conflicts the media are
rarely mobilised because the logic of audience ratings cannot be sustained once
conflicts pass into a less dramatic post-conflict phase. One of the challenges in
post-conflict environments is to succeed in making the logic of audience rating
and the logic of communication coincide. Indeed, it is often because of the
absence of public interest during post-conflict situations that Western 
governments fail to make strong and sustainable commitments to post-conflict
environments. 
6 Influence of decision-making processes and inter-institutional
relations
The difficulties in harmonising the different logics that drive the actions of the 
various actors involved in post-conflict environments can explain why international
security policies are often far from meeting the needs on the ground. But the issue
of coordination is not only a challenge for Northern actors deployed in post-conflict
theatres. There is a further factor that can have a negative impact on post-conflict
processes: bureaucratic relations between actors and institutions involved in 
policymaking processes (Egeberg 1999; Graham and Zelikov 1999; Halperin and
Kanter 1974). Indeed, post-conflict policies are often just as much informed by
inter-institutional processes as by local dynamics and interactions. Strategic 
choices made in the North are shaped by the interests of each department
involved in the construction of post-conflict policies. 
It appears that competition rather than convergence remains the main trend in
inter-institutional relations when post-conflict policies are at stake. Rivalries are
born out of the different institutions’ desires to play the role of a ‘lead agency’ on
post-conflict issues. The linkage between security and development is frequently
at the core of inter-institutional competition: increasing involvement in security
issues constitutes a means for institutions involved in development (such as DFID,
USAID, or Development General Directorate in the European Commission) to
respond to doubts regarding the efficiency of their development strategies. At the
same time, departments traditionally involved in security issues, notably
Departments of Defence, aim to affirm their credibility and to keep a hand on
processes that, in their perspective, still primarily rely on military dynamics. The
policies on the ground are often the result of compromises among these different
bureaucratic actors.
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7 Conclusion
Increasingly, major powers like the US, UK or France, as well as politico-
economic organisations, such as the UN and the EU, call for joint interagency
approaches aimed at increasing coherence among the institutional actors involved
in post-conflict environments. The emergence of so-called ‘integrated 
approaches’, which aim at enhancing the coordination and comprehensiveness of
security policies on the ground, is the major symptom of this tendency. However,
to be successful, such ‘joined-up government’ must harmonise the normative
agendas that determine the actions of each kind of institutional actor involved in
post-conflict situations. While comprehensiveness is often viewed as a way to
harmonise the practices, there is an urgent need to address the opposition – and
in some cases the competition – that exists between the institutional cultures, as
well as the normative standards of the actors deployed on the ground. 
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Why Identity Politics Matter for
Security and What Follows for
Research and Policy
Lyndsay McLean Hilker
8 Introduction: the relationship between identity, violence and 
(in)security
Although the destruction of human groups on the basis of their religious affiliation,
national identity or other group membership has a long history, it seems that 
‘identity-based’ conflicts have occurred more frequently in recent decades.3
Violence is increasingly perpetrated against individuals on the basis of their
belonging to a particular group (e.g. ethnic, religious, national, clan, caste), often
by individuals apparently acting on behalf of another group. Perhaps most 
disquieting is the increasing number of ‘ordinary’ civilians who are involved in this
violence as both victims and perpetrators. In some cases, people who have lived
side-by-side in peace for many years, engaging in friendships and even 
matrimonial relations, suddenly turn against each other with astonishing brutality.
Much of the literature on the relationship between identity, violence and 
(in)security has tended to polarise between two perspectives. The first variously
sees ‘identity-based’ conflicts as a product of ‘primordial’ cultural differences
(Geertz 1963), pre-existing kinship or religious ties (Smith 1986), longstanding
antipathy between different ‘ethnic’ or other groups (Kaplan 1993), or 
insurmountable differences between civilisations such as ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’
(Huntington 1996). To varying degrees, these authors see ‘ethnic’, and other 
identities as culturally determined, immutable or essential aspects of human 
societies. The second perspective comprises those who argue that such violence
is not about identity at all, but is really about competition between groups over
access to power and resources (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Cohen 1974).
Proponents of this perspective argue that ethnic, nationalist or other identities
come into being and endure for a purpose and are only relevant in as far as they
can be exploited for political or economic advantage in interaction with other
groups. Some authors highlight the role of ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ – political 
leaders that strategically instrumentalise cultural values, ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’
symbols to mobilise support for their claims (Brass 1985; Turton 1997).
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3 For example, the data presented by Stewart (2008a) show an increase in the proportion of major 
political violence labelled as ‘ethnic’ from 15 per cent in 1953 to nearly 60 per cent in 2005, but she 
comments that this in part is likely to reflect differences in the labelling of conflicts in the post-Cold 
War era (pp 6–7). 
Both of these perspectives might lead to that conclusion that it is not necessary to
pay much attention to the politics of identity. The first, because conflict on the
basis of identity differences is seen as inevitable, thus the focus should be on
intervening to prevent the use of violence. The second, because identity 
differences per se do not matter, thus the focus should be tackling underlying
grievances and mediating competing interests between groups in ways that do not
result in violence. In relation to the first perspective, however, there are now
numerous studies of violent contexts, which have shown that there is nothing
inevitable either about the nature of the identity differences purported or their
articulation through violence (e.g. Bringa 1995; Mamdani 2001; Valentine Daniel
1996). Equally, the absence of violence in many contexts with sharp cultural, 
religious or other group differences suggests that this perspective is flawed. In
relation to the second perspective, although there is little doubt that collective 
violence is largely rooted in competition over power, resources, territory and 
livelihoods, these instrumentalist arguments often fail to question where specific
‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ or other identities originate or why ‘ethnic’ or ‘religious’ symbols
have such appeal to the wider population (Turton 1997). Indeed, there is evidence
to suggest that struggles over ideas, beliefs and values are important in their own
right – not just in an instrumental sense (e.g. Bartov and Mack 2001;
Juergensmeyer 2003; Langer and Brown 2007).
In contrast to both perspectives, this paper argues that identity politics do matter –
both to the persistence of insecurity and to the achievement of greater security. It
argues that if we are to work to combat insecurity at the local and global level, we
need to take identity politics seriously, to look in more depth at the processes that
lead to the perpetration of violence in the name of identity in specific contexts, and
to explore interventions that can prevent and respond to this violence. In 
particular, we need to understand under what circumstances identity politics are
exercised in ways that are exclusionary or violent rather than inclusive and
empowering. The next section will therefore discuss why and how identity politics
matter and the final sections will draw out some implications for research and 
policy. To illustrate key points, this paper will draw on the case of Rwanda, the
location of some of the most brutal violence perpetrated in the name of identity. 
9 Why and how identity politics matter for security
The primary reason why identity politics matter for security is that evidence from
multiple contexts demonstrates that identity provides an effective basis for group
mobilisation into collective action – both violent and non-violent in nature. Whether
or not it is argued that identity differences are themselves a causal factor in 
violent conflict, examples from contexts as diverse as Bosnia, India, Sri Lanka
Rwanda, and – more recently – Kenya, demonstrate that identity provides an
extremely effective basis to mobilise people into violence. Whatever their 
complexities, in all these cases, violence has been perpetrated against people 
targeted on the basis of their (assumed) belonging to a particular ‘ethnic’ or 
‘religious’ group, usually by people belonging to another group.
It is important to recognise, however, that identity politics need not necessarily
lead to violence. Identities can also provide an important basis for empowerment
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and are used by groups to make claims and support the development of 
citizenship. Luckham et al. (2006) highlight the example of Bolivia, where they
argue that mobilisation of the indigenous Quechua and Aymara populations –
although occasionally punctuated by violence – has opened up key political
spaces for their rights and interests to be represented, in particular with respect to
the distribution of benefits from exploitation of the country’s natural resources (see
Crabtree 2005). It is therefore important to consider why identity provides such a
strong basis for group mobilisation and which factors determine whether this
results in violent rather than peaceful action. I will now examine the different 
arguments made in the literature and reflect on how they apply in the case of
Rwanda.
The first reason given to explain why identity provides an effective basis for 
mobilisation is that discrimination and exclusion often coincide with or take place
on the basis of group identities. In many societies, groups defined (by their own
members, other groups or the state) on the basis of racial, ethnic and religious or
other characteristics are marginalised or excluded from access to political, 
economic or other resources. It is therefore argued that these shared grievances
provide incentives for groups members to come together and engage in joint
action. For example, Stewart (2008a) argues that ‘horizontal inequalities’ (defined
as ‘inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status
between culturally defined groups’)4 are an important cause of violent conflict. On
the basis of eight case studies in Latin America, Southeast Asia and West Africa,
Stewart and her colleagues find that there is an increased probability of conflict
occurring where socioeconomic horizontal inequalities are high, especially when
these are consistent with political inequalities (pp 291–3).5 They stress, however,
that they have found a correlation between horizontal inequalities and risk of 
conflict and that there are cases where inequalities are high, but widespread 
violence has not occurred (e.g. Bolivia) or where violence is not primarily identity-
driven despite high horizontal inequalities (e.g. Guatemala). 
In the case of Rwanda, there were certainly high levels of inequality in the
decades preceding the 1994 genocide, but the principal gap was between a small
politically powerful and wealthy elite and the rural masses – Hutu and Tutsi alike –
most of which lived in abject poverty (Uvin 1998). Nonetheless, for at least a 
century, the political system has systematically discriminated against one or other
group. In the late nineteenth century, King Rwabugiri expanded state authority and
placed increasing power in the hands of Tutsi authorities, which they used to
enhance their control over land, cattle and people at the expense of Hutu lineages
(Newbury 1988: 17). Under colonial rule, underpinned by the racist ideologies of
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4 Stewart uses the following indicators of horizontal inequalities across the different dimensions: 
(i) Political = political participation in the cabinet, parliament, bureaucracy, local government and army;
(ii) Economic = ownership of assets (financial, land, livestock, human and social capital), employment 
opportunities and incomes; (iii) Social = access to services (education, health, water, sanitation and 
housing) and human outcome indicators (health level, educational achievements); (iv) Cultural status 
= (lack of) recognition of group’s cultural practices (dress, language etc)(p13).
5 In this case, they argue that both the leadership (because they are politically excluded) and the mass 
of the population (because they suffer from socioeconomic inequalities) have a motive for mobilisation.
the era,6 the preferential treatment of Tutsis continued. Critically, the Belgian 
colonial power racialised, politicised and institutionalised the identities ‘Hutu’,
‘Tutsi’ and ‘Twa’ through a number of measures: the distribution of ethnic identity
cards; reforming the state administration and chieftancy to ‘purify’ it of Hutu 
elements; strengthening systems of taxation and bonded labour; and establishing
a civil service training school almost exclusively for Tutsi (Prunier 1995: 26–7;
Mamdani 2001: 89–91). The combined effect of these measures was to 
consolidate further the power of Tutsi chiefs over the (largely Hutu)7 peasantry
and pave the way for political and economic competition to take place on ‘ethnic’
lines. 
After the 1959 ‘social revolution’8 and Independence in 1962, this underlying
‘structural violence’ and ‘racist prejudice’ continued under three decades of the
Hutu Republic, although it was inverted and it was the Tutsi population that 
suffered systematic discrimination (Uvin 1997). Tutsis were almost totally excluded
from political power and their vertical mobility was curbed via an ‘ethnic’ quota 
policy,9 which limited their access to education and certain employment sectors. In
practice, however, there were still a number of wealthy, educated Tutsi and the
majority of the Hutu population continued to suffer from poverty and margin-
alisation. Nonetheless, the Hutu elite managed to maintain legitimacy in the eyes
of the population by its claims to defend the rights and interests of the ‘Hutu
majority’ (Uvin 1997: 98). Both Uvin and Mamdani argue that in the early 1990s, in
a context of economic crisis, civil war and increasing impoverishment, this long-
standing ‘ethnic’ discrimination and the ‘ethnic’ ideology underpinning it were key
factors in the genocide.
The case of Rwanda therefore demonstrates two additional issues: (i) the key role
of the state in producing, politicising and institutionalising ‘ethnic’ or other 
identities;10 and (ii) that perceptions of inequality,11 discrimination and intergroup
animosity can be as important as the objective reality. This latter point is the 
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6 The ‘Hamitic hypothesis’ purported to explain the origin of ‘anomalous’ advanced civilisational traits in 
central Africa. It alleged that the Tutsi were ‘Hamites’, a Caucasoid race from north-eastern Africa who 
possessed superior moral and cultural characteristics and had conquered the less intelligent Negroid 
or ‘Bantu’ peoples of the region, including the Hutu and Twa of Rwanda (Taylor 1999: 55–97). 
7 The Hutu are the majority group in Rwanda, making up roughly 85 per cent of the population, with the 
Tutsi an estimated 15 per cent and the Twa less than 1 per cent.
8 Although its precise nature is disputed, the ‘social revolution’ was a Hutu uprising, supported by the 
departing Belgian colonial power, which led to the end of the Tutsi monarchy and the installation of the
‘Hutu Republic’.
9 Tutsi officially represented 9 per cent of the population and therefore the quota system stipulated that 
there could be no more than 9 per cent Tutsi in schools, the civil service or any given sector of 
employment (Chrétien 1985: 158–9). 
10 Luckham et al. (2006) discuss the way the state uses identities to regulate, discipline and control the 
population, thereby both politicising and ‘securitising’ them.
11 Based on research in Ghana and Nigeria, Stewart et al. (2008) stress that perceptions of horizontal 
inequalities (rather than actual objective inequalities) also affect the likelihood of conflict i.e. people 
take action because of perceived injustices rather than on the basis of data of which they might not be
aware (p293).
second reason given in the literature as to why identity provides an effective basis
for mobilisation – that people perceive identities to matter and these perceptions
inform their actions. This is broadly the view of social constructivist theorists of
identity who lay emphasis on what people believe or think identities to be (e.g.
Barth 1969; Anderson 1983; Jenkins 1994). These authors stress, however, that
the fact that identities such as ‘ethnicity’ are socially constructed does not prevent
them from enduring and having a material effect on people’s lives: ‘although 
[ethnicity] is (to various degrees and in various ways) “imagined” and “invented”, it
is not, as has often been pointed out, “imaginary”’ (Turton 1997: 3).
Returning to the case of Rwanda, in contrast to Uvin, a number of authors argue
that the genocide was not directly caused by ‘ethnicity’, but by other factors such
as the economic and political crisis, the context of civil war, the extent of state
power and control and individual opportunism’ (e.g. Prunier 1995; Straus 2006).
Nonetheless, the genocide was clearly about ethnicity in terms of the selection of
its victims and the specific nature of the torture and killing they endured (Taylor
1999). Whilst Tutsis were not the only victims of the mass killing that took place in
Rwanda from April to July 1994, the majority of individuals were targeted on the
basis of their assumed belonging to the Tutsi ‘ethnie’. Furthermore, testimonies
suggest that to many of the victims and perpetrators, the killing was very much
about ‘ethnicity’ and getting rid of Rwanda’s ‘Tutsi’ population (Hatzfeld 2000 and
2003). Thus, even if the genocide was not caused by ‘ethnic’ differences per se,
this does not mean that people’s understandings and experiences of ‘ethnicity’ did
not shape individual motivations, processes of mobilisation or the nature of the
killing.
In this respect, David Turton (1997) notes that ‘ethnicity’ seems to be particularly
potent as a mobilising force in violence.12 Drawing on Glazer and Moynihan
(1979), he argues that the ‘strategic efficacy’ of ethnicity as a means of mobilising
groups around common material interests is due to its non-material (symbolic)
content, which masks those interests for the group members. He says that ‘ethnic’
symbols of culture, religion and language are by definition ambiguous, imprecise
and flexible and thus effective as a mobilising tool because they allow ‘scope for
interpretative manoeuvre’ (Cohen 1985). Thus, in periods of change, members
may still experience their ethnic identity as a constant and leaders can use these
malleable but potent symbols to mobilise collective action in response to new 
conditions and in pursuit of new objectives. In short: ‘[I]ts very effectiveness as a
means of advancing group interests depends on it being seen as “primordial” by
those who make claims in its name’ (Turton 1997: 11). 
The explanations above certainly give some insights into why certain identities
provide an effective basis for group mobilisation, but they seem insufficient in
terms of explaining specifically when and why collective action results in violence.
In this respect, Luckham et al. (2006: 6) argue that violence is more likely to occur
when its benefits rise relative to other forms of collective action and when the
costs of violence are reduced. They list a number of conditions they say can 
combine to generate violence including: poor conflict management where groups
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12 Turton’s arguments cover ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’ and ‘national’ identities.
are unable to pursue grievances through political processes; moments of 
transition or acute political crisis; challenges to the state’s monopoly of violence;
the existence of material (e.g. high-value resources) or non-material (e.g. 
religious) rewards for violence; and the role of international actors (diasporas,
transnational crime and terrorist networks) who may nurture violence for their own
ends (pp 6–8).
Again, although explaining why political elites or particular interest groups may
choose violence as a means to achieve political or economic ends, they seem to
fall short of explaining situations like Bosnia and Rwanda where ordinary civilians
become perpetrators of violence. In this respect, Sen (2006) argues that a key
factor in contemporary violence is the ‘illusion of a singular identity’ – the 
assumption that any person pre-eminently belongs to only one collectivity. Sen
argues that those intent on using violent means to achieve their goals skilfully 
cultivate this illusion of a singular identity – eclipsing the relevance of other 
affiliations – and then redefine this sole identity in a belligerent form to incite 
people to commit violence in its name (pp 175–6).
Although perhaps not useful in explaining situations like Somalia where multiple
identities are at play, Sen’s thesis certainly resonates in the case of Rwanda. As
discussed above, an analysis of the testimonies of victims and killers, as well as
the political discourse and genocidal propaganda of the early 1990s, 
demonstrates the extent to which a binary ‘ethnic’ logic dominated in the lead-up
to the genocide. This logic systematically equated ‘the Tutsi’ as a group, all Tutsi
(not just those fighting with the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)) as the 
categorical enemy of all Hutu – and thus as legitimate targets for violence in a 
situation of war (Straus 2006: 9; Chrétien et al. 1995: 139–208). This still doesn’t
explain, however, why the equation ‘Tutsi = enemy’ resonated to such an extent
that it led so many people to kill their former social intimates, in some cases 
voluntarily or willingly (Des Forges 1999: 260; testimonies in Hatzfeld 2003).
Building on Turton’s arguments, the example of Rwanda also demonstrates that
the specific nature of the ethnic discourse and symbols used to distinguish
between, mobilise and vilify groups of people matters.13 The genocidal discourse
was replete with particular deeply-engrained ‘ethnic’ stereotypes of Rwandan 
society and history, which recalled past periods of ‘ethnic’ violence14 and stressed
the danger represented by ‘the Tutsi’ because of their innate nature: their 
propensity to rule, intelligence, malice, superiority, secrecy and clannishness
(Chrétien et al. 1995: 151–62). The existence of these longstanding stereotypes
made the constant warnings about the risk of ‘infiltration’ by Tutsi ibyitso –
‘accomplices’ of the RPA – seem plausible and contributed to the atmosphere or
fear and paranoia. Furthermore, the fact that the differences posited between
Hutus and Tutsis had long been constructed as primordial or racial made them
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13 A similar argument has also been made in the case of political Islam, which makes universalising 
moral and political claims directed at all Muslims and thus is capable of mobilising people for political 
goals across national boundaries.
14 Indeed, violence itself can play a key role in forming, transforming and politicising ‘ethnic’ and other 
identities.
particularly potent and durable. The implication was that these differences were
innate and therefore unchangeable, therefore providing a justification for the claim
that the only solution to Rwanda’s problems was to eliminate all Tutsi. Thus, when
the organisers of the genocide reworked pre-existing ‘ethnic’ myths and 
stereotypes, they resonated sufficiently with people’s prior knowledge to persuade
them that what the propagandists claimed was true: that their liberty, land and
livelihoods were under threat; that the enemy was not just the RPA, but all Tutsi;
that the choice was to kill or be killed.
10 Implications for research and policy
The discussion above suggests that identity politics matter for security as identity
can provide an extremely effective basis for collective mobilisation. The case of
Rwanda also demonstrates that the specific ways in which ‘ethnic’ and other 
identities are constructed, experienced and politicised can be a key factor in 
violence. This suggests that we need to look in more depth at the processes that
lead to the perpetration of violence in the name of identity in specific contexts and
to explore the types of interventions that can prevent and respond to this violence.
In this respect, there are a number of specific areas where further research would
be useful:
1 Improving understanding of the proximate causes and dynamics of identity-
based violence in specific contexts: Although many of the underlying 
structural causes of violence (e.g. poverty, inequality, exclusion, resource 
scarcity/abundance) have been well researched, there is a more limited body 
of research on the proximate causes of violence. In particular, we have a 
limited understanding of precisely why, when and how particular 
organisations, groups and individuals decide to engage in violence rather than
adopt other strategies to achieve their objectives. There is evidence to 
suggest that the role of leaders is very important in mobilising violent action 
(e.g. Brass 1991; Gallagher 1997), but there are few comprehensive studies 
of the followers and precisely what motivates them to support or engage in 
violence. Who are the followers and why do they follow? How do they come 
to see violence as legitimate? Are there specific triggers (e.g. economic 
shocks, elections) that lead to violence? 
2 Exploring why particular identities (e.g. religious, ethnic) provide such an 
effective basis for political mobilisation and mobilisation into violence: In the 
wake of recent ‘Islamist’ terrorist attacks, there has been popular speculation 
about whether there is something inherently violent about Islam. Although 
such popular myths can be quickly dispelled through informed analysis (e.g. 
Lawrence 2000), there is a need to better understand why certain religious 
and ethnic identities provide such an effective basis for mobilisation – 
especially into violent action. We need to examine more closely how religious 
and ethnic identities are constructed, interpreted, represented and rendered 
belligerent and how this impacts on the potential for violence. What are the 
similarities and differences between processes of ethnic and religious 
mobilisation in different contexts? What forms of ethnic or religious discourse 
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are particularly powerful and why? What are the roles of values and beliefs in 
motivating people to engage in violence?
3 Identifying how global, regional and local factors intersect to aggravate or 
alleviate tensions between groups: The role of transnational or cross-border 
factors (e.g. competition over resources, international organised crime net
works, international military interventionism, global financial crises cross-
border flows of arms, drugs people etc,) in driving and sustaining violent 
conflict is increasingly recognised (e.g. Duffield 2001; Kaldor 2007). It would 
be useful to build on this work and look specifically at how global or regional 
factors impact on the politics of identity in particular contexts and aggravate or
alleviate tensions between groups and countries. Equally, it would be useful to
look at the role of trans-border or globalised ethnic and religious identities, 
building on the work of Stewart (2008b), which suggests that inequalities 
faced by a group in one part of the world (e.g. Muslims in Western societies) 
may become a source of grievance and mobilisation elsewhere. 
11 Implications for policy and practice
In terms of the implications for policy, there are a number of conclusions that lead
on from the discussion above:
1 There is a need to bridge the gap between analysis of and response to 
identity-based violence: Rwanda remains the classic case of international 
inaction in the face of predictions of widespread ethnic violence (Melvern 
2000). Since this time, there has been a proliferation of new tools and 
approaches adopted by policymakers – particularly Northern donor agencies 
– to conduct better analysis of the causes and consequences of conflict. 
Nonetheless, recent evidence suggests that there are still gaps between 
analysis and response. For example, although it was difficult to predict the 
scale of the post-elections violence in Kenya in early 2008, there has been a 
history of political mobilisation on the basis of ethnicity and election-related 
violence in Kenya since 1992. This suggests that a degree of violence could 
have been anticipated and measures taken to prevent it, but also that 
underlying grievances related to land, exclusion and access to political power 
have not been tackled for many decades. In many cases, like Rwanda in 
1994, the gap between analysis and response relates to a lack of political will,
but in others it reflects difficulties in applying the analysis to practice.
2 Local and international policies and programmes need to be designed in ways
that do not aggravate tensions between groups: Uvin (1998) demonstrated 
how external development assistance reinforced a state system responsible 
for widespread ‘structural violence’ and group-based exclusion in Rwandan 
society and therefore unwittingly abetted some of the factors that contributed 
to the genocide. In the wake of this and similar studies, there has been a 
widespread move towards ‘do no harm’ approaches – basing aid programmes
on rigorous analysis of the underlying dynamics of conflict to ensure they do 
not aggravate intergroup tensions (Anderson 1999). Recent evaluations 
suggest that while many individual projects and programmes have been 
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reasonably effective in this respect, further work is needed to make links 
between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ projects, to look at the ‘cumulative impact’ of 
policies and programmes across sectors (Anderson and Olson 2003) and to 
better integrate humanitarian, development, diplomatic and military inter-
ventions (Call and Cousens 2007).
3 There is a need for more policies and programmes to reduce inequalities and 
tensions between groups, combat negative stereotypes, and build positive 
relations: There has been recent interest among policymakers in the design of
institutional mechanisms to manage identity politics peacefully and promote 
inclusion and accountability (e.g. via ‘statebuilding’ and ‘democracy building’
approaches). This is yet to be matched, however, with more proactive 
(‘peacebuilding’ or ‘reconciliation’) approaches targeted specifically at 
reducing tensions and building positive relations between groups. In this 
respect, Stewart et al. (2008) review a range of policy options for reducing 
horizontal inequalities15 and Luckham et al. (2006) present policy measures 
to address the underlying conditions of identity-based violence or tackle such 
violence directly.16 These authors stress the need to design interventions 
based on analysis of the nature and sources of inequality and grievance in a 
specific society, the importance of tackling intergroup prejudice and negative 
perceptions, and of assessing carefully how best to initiate, implement and 
manage policy changes. For example, in the case of Rwanda, the current 
approach to reconciliation, which is based on ‘de-ethnicising’ Rwandan 
society and promoting a unified Rwandan identity, does not appear to be 
working (Buckley-Zistel 2006). Whilst the goals may be laudable, recent 
research suggests that ethnic identities are still salient, inter-’ethnic’ relations 
are characterised by significant levels of fear and mistrust, and there is a 
worrying persistence of certain negative ‘ethnic’ stereotypes, which were a 
factor in the violence (McLean Hilker forthcoming). The Rwandan case 
demonstrates clearly the need for proactive policies to explicitly combat 
negative stereotypes and promote opportunities for dialogue, cooperation and
the fostering of positive relations between groups.
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15 These include direct approaches (e.g. affirmative action, group quotas, credit measures targeted at 
specific groups), indirect approaches (e.g. power-sharing and voting systems, anti-discrimination 
legislation, progressive taxation policies) and ‘integrationist’ approaches, which are aimed at reducing 
group salience (e.g. banning ethnic/religious political parties, civic citizenship education, incentives for 
shared economic or political activities across groups).
16 Policies to address the underlying conditions of identity-based violence include: addressing regional, 
horizontal and vertical inequalities and unequal resource distribution, tackling bad governance and 
corruption, working through civil society as well as the state, support for decentralisation, opening 
spaces for dialogue and inclusion. Policies that aim to tackle identity-based insecurity directly include: 
improving the quality of and access to justice and policing systems; measures to tackle prejudice and 
build public support for non-violent conflict resolution, supporting anti-corruption measures and 
tackling organised crime, inclusive human rights programmes, tackling gender-based violence, and 
promoting inclusive recruitment into security forces.
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